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Do Underwriters Certify Value? 
Evidence from UK Rights Issues and Open Offers 
 
 
Abstract 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) have proposed 
that underwriters of seasoned equity offers certify issuer value. The study tests 
predictions resulting from these papers and finds little evidence from UK 
rights issues and open offers that underwriting banks certify. The main 
purpose of underwriting appears to be simply to guarantee the proceeds. There 
is a positive reaction to open offers (a type of private placing) but this is 
unlikely to be due to underwriter certification. There is a large loss of value 
for companies announcing deeply discounted offers, which is attributed to 
release of bad news on announcement.    
 
Keywords: rights issues, open offers, underwriting, discount, certification. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the decisions companies take when making a seasoned equity offer (SEO) is 
the type of offer to use, including how much of the offer, if any, should be underwritten. It has 
been suggested that a major benefit of underwriting is that the underwriting bank certifies the 
value of the issuing company, and the purpose of this paper is to examine whether this is so in 
UK rights issues and open offers. In particular, the paper tests predictions arising from the 
theory of issue method developed by Eckbo and Masulis (EM, 1992) and from the view of 
underwriter certification proposed by Slovin, Sushka and Lai (SSL, 2000). 
 The EM theory extends the model of Myers and Majluf (1984), which predicts a 
negative reaction to the announcement of SEOs because the decision to issue implies that the 
issuer is more likely to be overvalued than undervalued, if the shares are sold to new 
investors. The feature added by EM is that underwriting by the arranger is assumed to provide 
imperfect certification that the issuer is not overvalued, which enables the issuer to sell shares 
at a higher price. The value of this certification benefit is negatively related to the proportion 
of the issue expected to be taken up by existing shareholders, so a higher take-up implies a 
lower probability that the issue will be underwritten. The predictions regarding market 
reaction depend on how reliable certification is assumed to be. EM assume that certification 
is sufficiently unreliable that the positive effect of underwriting on market price is less than 
the negative effect of low take-up in underwritten offers.  
SSL’s study of SEOs in the UK endorses the idea that underwriters certify value, but 
argues that certification is more reliable than EM assume, and can result in an increase in 
issuer value. SSL find that the reaction to non-underwritten rights issues is more negative 
than to underwritten rights issues, and that the reaction to bought deals is positive. Their 
interpretation is that the reliability of underwriter certification depends on the type of offer 
and risk to the underwriter, with bought deals carrying reliable certification and non-
underwritten rights zero certification. 
The current paper uses data from UK rights issues and open offers, the most common 
methods of issue in the 1990s. An open offer is a private placing with pre-emption rights 
preserved. Shares in the open offer are placed by verbal agreement with new investors before 
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the offer is announced, but existing shareholders retain the right to subscribe in proportion to 
their current holdings. The EM theory predicts that the proportion of an issue underwritten is 
negatively related to the take-up by existing shareholders, but we do not find this using 
proxies for expected take-up. Rather, issues are normally fully underwritten except to the 
extent that legally binding commitments have been given in advance of the public 
announcement to buy some or all of the shares. Although non-underwritten offers have 
relatively deep discounts, companies very rarely use a deep discount on its own as a substitute 
for underwriting. The shares in most non-underwritten offers are mainly or entirely pre-
committed. This is consistent with the view of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC, 1999) that UK companies are very concerned with certainty of the proceeds in an 
SEO. The EM theory further predicts that abnormal returns on announcement are negatively 
related to the proportion underwritten, and that they are positively related to take-up by 
existing shareholders. But abnormal returns are not related either to the proportion 
underwritten or to proxies for take-up.  
SSL suggest that the reliability of underwriter certification depends on the financial 
risk borne by the underwriter. The arranging bank bears little risk if it underwrites either a 
rights issue or an open offer, so the SSL view predicts that the market reaction to both types 
of offer is similar. Since the take-up by existing shareholders is almost certainly lower in open 
offers than in rights issues, the EM theory likewise predicts a similar, or more negative, 
response to open offers. However, we find that the average abnormal return on announcement 
of offers 50% or more underwritten is -2.6% for rights issues and 2.9% for open offers. The 
difference in reaction emerges both in the full sample and in a much smaller sample with no 
major news in the prospectus other than the offer itself. The lack of event study evidence that 
underwriting banks certify, together with the finding that underwriting is a substitute for pre-
commitment, imply that the primary benefit of underwriting is to guarantee the proceeds, and 
that the explanation for the positive reaction to open offers should be sought elsewhere than 
in underwriter certification. In both open offers and private placings, blocks of shares are sold 
to investors through private negotiation before announcement. Other studies have reported a 
positive reaction to private placings, and the reasons they advance provide possible 
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explanations for the positive reaction we find to open offers. These reasons include 
certification of issuer value by placees (Hertzel and Smith, 1993), improved monitoring by 
the new investors (Wruck, 1989), and know-how from the new investors and increased 
probability of the issuer being taken over (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2000).  
A further result from the event study is that a deeper discount is associated with a 
more negative abnormal return, as SSL also find. Their interpretation is that a deep discount 
is a substitute for underwriting in a non-underwritten issue, with no certification, and that in 
an underwritten issue it signals that the value certified is below the prevailing market price. 
We offer a different explanation. Four fifths of the issuers choosing a deep discount (30% to 
the market price or deeper) are in difficulty, and the reaction on announcement for the 
minority of healthy companies is close to zero. We infer that the loss in value associated with 
deep discounts is primarily explained by bad news released on announcement or during the 
offer, and that offer prices are adjusted downwards by companies which anticipate a fall in 
share price. Whilst deep discounts are associated with overvalued issuers, the cause of the 
price fall on announcement is not the deep discount itself. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the arguments of EM and 
SSL, sets out the predictions to be tested, and reviews existing evidence. Section 3 describes 
selling and underwriting arrangements in UK rights issues and open offers, and tests whether 
the proportion underwritten is related to the proportion taken up by existing shareholders. 
Section 4 presents the event study evidence and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. UNDERWRITER CERTIFICATION 
(i) The Eckbo-Masulis Theory 
The EM theory builds on the model of Myers and Majluf (1984), in which it is 
assumed that managers are better informed about the company’s value than outsiders, and that 
they maximise the intrinsic (full information) value of the existing shares. If the new shares 
are all sold to new investors, and the managers know the company is overvalued, they will 
always issue. But they will not issue if the company is sufficiently undervalued that the loss to 
existing shareholders arising from selling new shares at below their intrinsic value exceeds 
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the existing holders’ share of the gain from the ‘project’ to be financed by the proceeds. A 
decision to issue therefore signals that the highest estimates of the intrinsic value of the 
company are ruled out, and implies that the company is more likely than not to be overvalued 
at the market price before the announcement. So the market price is predicted to fall on 
announcement. The net benefit of issue is [P′/(P′ + E)](E + a + b) - a, where a is the intrinsic 
value of assets in place, b is the NPV of an investment opportunity for which new equity is 
required (b ≥ 0), P′ is the market value of the existing shares after announcement of the issue, 
and E is the proceeds raised from new investors. [P′/(P′ + E)](E + a + b) is the intrinsic value 
of the existing shareholders’ equity if the company issues and invests; a is the intrinsic value 
of their equity if there is no issue and the investment opportunity is not taken (so b = 0). 
 EM write the net benefit of issue as b - (c + f), where c is the cost or benefit arising 
from selling shares to new investors at below or above their intrinsic value, and f is the direct 
costs of issue. The intrinsic value of the existing equity is a + b, ignoring all costs of issue 
and therefore assuming that the investment opportunity is taken. With information 
asymmetry, P′  may be higher or lower than a + b, and 
 c  =  a + b - [P′/(P′ + E)](E + a + b). (1) 
It can be seen that c is positive (a cost) if P′  <  a + b. E varies with a number of factors, but 
EM focus on the proportion of the new shares bought by existing holders, k, which they 
assume is given exogenously. If k = 1, E = 0 and so c = 0. The company will always issue so 
long as b > f, even if it is very undervalued, so the predicted change in share price is zero or 
slightly positive when the issue is announced (slightly positive if there was uncertainty before 
the issue announcement about whether b exceeded f). If k < 1, some funds are raised from 
new investors, so the share price is expected to fall on announcement of the issue, and c could 
be non-zero because E > 0. Other things equal, as k diminishes, E increases, and both the loss 
in market value on announcement and c increase (lower P′ entails higher c). Myers and 
Majluf (p. 206) report the results of numerical experiments which show how the loss in 
market value varies with the proportion of a project financed by cash in hand, which has the 
same effect as varying k.  
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EM assume that underwriting provides imperfect certification to investors that the 
issuer is not overvalued. Although a non-underwritten issue still requires the services of an 
intermediary, the assumption is that certification of value by the intermediary is more reliable 
if it has underwritten the issue. Underwriting therefore results in a higher P′ than would result 
from a non-underwritten issue, so underwriting reduces c. The company opts for 
underwriting, given its knowledge of k, if b - (c + f) is both positive and larger than b - (c + f) 
for a non-underwritten offer. If k = 1, both undervalued and overvalued companies will issue 
(if b > f) and will choose a non-underwritten offer, because c is zero and non-underwritten 
offers have the lowest direct costs. If k = 0, companies which issue will choose an 
underwritten offer because the benefit from a smaller c is assumed to exceed the extra cost of 
underwriting (a higher f). Some undervalued companies with k = 0 will choose not to issue, 
whereas overvalued companies will always issue, unless the underwriter refuses to certify that 
the company is not overvalued. In this case, the company either issues at a lower underwritten 
price, or does not issue. For any company there is some value k*, where 1 > k* ≥ 0, below 
which underwriting becomes worthwhile, if it issues at all. Whilst underwritten issues will be 
more expensive than non-underwritten issues in terms of direct costs, the net benefit [= b - (c 
+ f)] of an underwritten issue will be greater than if it were not underwritten, given k. Because 
underwriter certification of value is imperfect, the negative relation between abnormal return 
on announcement and k is expected to be preserved. Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997, p. 
233) note the possibility that screening by underwriters may prevent so many overvalued 
companies from issuing that there is a positive reaction to underwritten offers. This 
possibility is not made explicit in EM (1992). Both they and Bøhren et al. clearly regard the 
theory as predicting a more negative reaction to underwritten offers (EM, 1992, pp. 314 and 
325; Bøhren et al., 1997, pp. 229 and 249).  
The theory as outlined so far is a theory of the circumstances in which issuers pay for 
underwriting. It does not explain why companies might prefer a firm commitment to an 
underwritten rights issue nor, more generally, how companies choose between different types 
of underwritten offer. EM make no distinction between types of underwritten offer in terms of 
the reliability of certification. They state that there are ‘additional issuer-borne rights 
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distribution costs’ implied by the underwritten rights method (p. 312), and that below a 
certain value of k it becomes cheaper to opt for a firm commitment. We test the following 
three predictions resulting from the EM theory.  
P1. The proportion underwritten is negatively related to k, the proportion of shares 
expected to be sold to existing shareholders. This follows because the benefit of 
underwriting is to increase P′. A lower k implies a higher E, which implies a lower P′ 
in the absence of underwriting. It also means there is a higher proportion of non-
subscribers, and it is they who benefit from a higher P’. Since there are proportions 
underwritten between 100% and 0%, we express underwriting as a continuous 
variable rather than all-or-nothing.  
P2. Abnormal returns on announcement are negatively related to the proportion 
underwritten.  
P3. Abnormal returns on announcement are positively related to k, unless P1 is true but P2 
is false (ie underwriting has a positive effect on market reaction).  
The theory as presented by EM (1992) and Bøhren et al. (1997) predicts that P1, P2 and P3 
are all true. 
Supporting evidence has so far been provided by EM using US data and  Bøhren et al. 
using Norwegian data. EM note that there are substantial commitments to subscribe made 
before the announcement by existing shareholders in non-underwritten rights issues, but 
virtually none in underwritten issues, as expected if k affects whether the issue is underwritten 
(P1). They confirm earlier findings that the average abnormal return is less negative on 
announcement of rights issues than of firm commitment offers, although there is no 
difference between the average abnormal return for non-underwritten and underwritten rights. 
They augment this with a cross-sectional regression in which the dependent variable for each 
issue is the abnormal return on announcement with direct costs per share added back, and the 
explanatory variables include a dummy for an underwritten issue and a dummy for a firm 
commitment. The results are not clear-cut, but the authors conclude that ‘the market reaction 
net of flotation costs is most negative for underwritten offerings and least negative for 
uninsured rights’ (p. 325), which supports P2.  
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Bøhren et al. provide further support for the theory. There are no firm commitments in 
Norway, but they confirm that underwriting increases the direct costs of rights issues. 
Subscription pre-commitments are rarely reported, so they measure k as one minus the 
proportion of rights sold during the offer period. They construct a model to predict k and find 
that whether an offer is underwritten is negatively related to their proxy for k, as P1 predicts. 
They also find that the average abnormal return on announcement is positive for non-
underwritten issues and marginally negative for underwritten issues, which is consistent with 
P2 . 
 
(ii) The View of Slovin, Sushka and Lai 
SSL examine abnormal returns on announcement of UK rights issues and bought 
deals.1 They describe a bought deal as ‘a non-rights method of flotation in which an 
underwriter purchases an equity offering from the issuing firm on the spot at a fixed price, 
and sells the shares to clients...’ (p. 158). This contrasts with private placings and open offers, 
in which the shares are placed by private negotiation with investors before the price is fixed 
and the issue is publicly announced. SSL find that the average abnormal return on 
announcement is 3.3% for bought deals, -2.9% for underwritten rights issues and -5.0% for 
non-underwritten rights, though the difference between the latter two figures is not 
significant. These findings are not consistent with P2. SSL’s interpretation is that the 
reliability of underwriter certification depends on the risk. The underwriter has most risk in a 
bought deal, so has most incentive to verify that the issuer is not overvalued in that type of 
offer. The risk is less in underwritten rights issues, because the underwriter will only be called 
upon to buy shares if the market price is below the offer price by the end of the offer period, 
and most rights issues are made at a substantial discount. There is no financial risk to the 
arranger in a non-underwritten issue. The authors argue that undervalued companies choose 
bought deals, with the most rigorous evaluation by the underwriter, to distinguish themselves 
from other issuers and to increase ownership dispersion.  
The current paper examines rights issues and open offers. Section 3 below explains 
that the risk to the underwriter is very small in an open offer, as in a rights issue. If market 
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reaction is affected by reliability of underwriter certification, as SSL contend, there should be 
little difference between the reactions to underwritten rights issues and underwritten open 
offers. EM do not consider either open offers or bought deals, but their theory predicts that 
the reaction to SEOs depends on k (P3). It would be natural to suppose that k is higher in 
rights issues, because an open offer involves a placing of shares with new investors, so there 
is little point in choosing an open offer if the issuer expects most of the shares to be taken up 
by the existing holders. k is less than one in 32% of rights issues and 64% of open offers 
according to the proxy we can calculate for both types of offer. Hence, a further prediction 
from both EM and SSL is: 
P4. The average abnormal return (AAR) on announcement of underwritten open offers is 
equal to or less than the AAR on announcement of underwritten rights issues. 
 
3. EXPLAINING THE PROPORTION UNDERWRITTEN 
(i) Types of Offer and Underwriter Risk 
The types of SEO for cash in the UK are rights issues, open offers, private placings 
and bought deals.2 In a rights issue the new shares are issued in nil-paid form pro rata to 
existing shareholders, and the offer lasts a minimum of three weeks. Nil-paid shares (rights) 
which shareholders do not wish to take up are sold on the market (unless the rights are pre-
renounced, which is explained below). The rights will have a value so long as the company’s 
share price remains above the offer price during the offer. An open offer can be described as a 
private placing with pre-emption rights preserved. The normal procedure is that the arranging 
bank or broker negotiates privately with investing institutions over several days before the 
public announcement, so that by the announcement day the arranger has a list of placees who 
have agreed verbally to buy blocks of shares. Potential placees agree to become insiders and 
are obliged not to trade in the issuer’s shares until after the announcement. Legally binding 
contracts to buy are signed on or after the announcement day. It is not necessary to find 
placees for shares which existing shareholders or other interested parties have already 
committed themselves to buy. The new shares are offered pro rata to existing shareholders, as 
in a rights issue, and if taken up they are said to be ‘clawed back’ from the placees. But the 
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rights in an open offer are entitlements only, not new shares in nil-paid form. The 
entitlements can not be sold and have no value if not taken up. Shares not clawed back are 
allocated to the placees at the end of the offer at the offer price, and our data shows that on 
average about half the shares are not clawed back.  
In a private placing or subscription, and in a bought deal, one or more investors agrees 
to buy shares which are not offered pro rata to existing shareholders. Shareholders must have 
voted in advance to disapply pre-emption rights. A private placing can be made either on a 
stand-alone basis or alongside a rights issue or open offer, in which case the placing is 
described in the same prospectus and the shares are placed at the same price as the shares in 
the rights issue or open offer. The sequence is reversed in a bought deal: the arranging bank 
buys the new shares at a fixed price, the issue is announced, and then the arranger finds 
placees. It is clear from prospectuses that the placings accompanying rights issues and open 
offers are not bought deals, because the placee(s) has already agreed to buy the shares by the 
time the offer is announced.  
The contractual role of the arranger as underwriter is to buy unsold shares at the offer 
price, up to the limit of its underwriting commitment. However, it is routine for the 
underwriting bank in a rights issue or open offer to transfer the underwriting risk and part of 
its fee to investing institutions on the announcement day (a fact not mentioned by SSL). 
When institutions accept the risk by signing an underwriting contract, the shares are said to 
have been sub-underwritten in a rights issue and placed with clawback or placed conditionally 
in an open offer (they will already have been placed by verbal agreement). In a rights issue the 
sub-underwriters are providing a guarantee; they will not receive any shares unless the market 
price is below the offer price at the end of the offer, in which case rights not already taken up 
can not be sold on the market. In an open offer the placees are not merely providing a 
guarantee: they buy all the shares not clawed back by existing shareholders. The sub-
underwriting or placing contract is between the arranger and the sub-underwriter/placee; the 
arranger remains liable to the issuer for guaranteeing purchase of shares it has underwritten. 
For non-underwritten shares, the arranger is still paid to use its ‘reasonable endeavours’ to 
find buyers, but provides no guarantee.  
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The question of whether shares are placed before or after they are underwritten (if they 
are underwritten) is important in understanding the role the underwriter. If the shares are 
placed verbally or contractually before the announcement, as in an open offer or a private 
placing, potential placees can investigate the issuer, decide whether to invest and how much 
they wish to buy, and indicate the maximum price they are prepared to pay for the new shares. 
The price can then be set with the benefit of this information, and the issue announced. The 
arranger has very little financial risk in underwriting either a rights issue or an open offer or a 
private placing, and so has little additional incentive to evaluate the issuer if it underwrites. 
The risk in underwriting a rights issue is that the arranger fails to find enough sub-
underwriters after the announcement, but this risk can be made as small as is seen fit by 
setting a lower offer price. This does not harm non-subscribers because they can sell the 
rights. Risk in underwriting an open offer or private placing can only arise if placees have not 
been found for all the shares by the announcement day, or if a placee reneges on a verbal 
agreement by declining to sign a placing contract.3 Discounts tend to be less deep in open 
offers, because non-subscribers can not sell their rights. The pre-announcement placing 
process means the issue has effectively been sold at an offer price known to be acceptable to 
the placees. 
 
(ii) Features of the Sample 
Our initial sample consists of 1,378 issues, 928 rights issues and 450 open offers, 
made between 1 January, 1985 and 30 September, 1996. 1,168 of the issues were made in the 
1990s. The first open offer in the sample was in 1987 and there were only 20 before 1990, but 
they had become as common as rights issues by 1996. The information on issues comes from 
prospectuses (listing particulars) and from company announcements to the London Stock 
Exchange, both available from Primark Extel.4 The prospectus is sent to shareholders on the 
day the issue is announced.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by type of issue for the proportion underwritten 
and for several other variables which are relevant to the study. 42% of issues are less than 
100% underwritten, including 13% which are entirely non-underwritten.5 In nearly two thirds 
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of issues, the prospectus records that commitments have been received to subscribe for some 
or all of the shares, and the average proportion pre-committed in these issues is 30%. Pre-
commitments include undertakings by existing shareholders to subscribe for their 
entitlements and undertakings by parties other than the arranger to buy or underwrite shares to 
which they are not initially entitled. Shares in a private placing accompanying the rights issue 
or open offer are also counted as pre-committed; the placees in most cases are new investors. 
The above undertakings are usually given by named individual or corporate investors, rather 
than by investing institutions. There is a case for including all open offer shares as pre-
committed, on the assumption that placees will have been found and will have given verbal 
agreements by the announcement day. However, these agreements are not legally binding and 
prospectuses do not explicitly record them or name the placees, so we do not treat them as 
pre-commitments. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
28% of rights issues and 47% of open offers have entitlements which have been pre-
renounced; the prospectus records that the shareholders entitled to the shares will definitely 
not be subscribing. The average proportion pre-renounced in these issues is 32%. Pre-
renounced shares in open offers are ‘placed firm’ before the announcement along with other 
shares ‘placed with clawback’. Pre-renounced shares in rights issues are also placed before or 
on the announcement day; they are not sold on the market. The placees are usually new 
investors in the form of unnamed institutions procured, or about to be procured, by the 
broker. Pre-renounced shares which have not been underwritten by the arranger but which are 
recorded explicitly as having been placed are counted as pre-committed. If it is unclear 
whether pre-renounced shares have been placed, they are not counted as pre-committed.  
 We have restricted pre-commitments to undertakings to buy which are clearly stated 
in the prospectus. It is not always certain that the undertaking is legally binding, and reporting 
practice regarding pre-commitments may not be entirely consistent across prospectuses. But 
statements regarding pre-commitments and pre-renunciations are normally treated as 
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important information and can be expected to be accurate. They are given prominence in the 
Chairman’s letter which introduces the prospectus, as well as being recorded under 
‘Additional Information’ at the back. The MMC (1999) report on underwriting services 
contains no criticism of the scope or reliability of information in prospectuses. 
 Table 1 shows, in addition, average and median discounts to the market price before 
the announcement, and to the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP). The TERP is defined as 
PB[S/(S + N)]  + PO[N/(S + N)], where PB is the mid-point share price at the close of the day 
before the announcement, PO is the offer price, S is the number of existing shares and N is the 
number of new shares offered pro rata to existing shareholders.6 If there is a dividend to 
which the existing shares are entitled but not the new shares, the after tax dividend per share 
is subtracted from the value of the market price in calculating the discount. Issues at a 
premium of more than 5% to the market price are excluded from analysis involving discounts. 
Most are associated with a capital reorganisation which means that the premium is illusory. 
The average discount to the market price in rights issues is 21.0% (median 17.6%) compared 
with an average of 13.0% (7.8%) in open offers. Results are reported using discount to market 
price (discount), but throughout the paper the results are similar using discount to TERP (the 
correlation between the two measures is 0.92). 
 
(iii) Proxies for k   
EM (1992) and Bøhren et al. (1997) assume that the issuer has a good estimate of k 
before the offer and that investors can infer k from information announced and from trading 
of rights during the offer. Prospectuses do indeed provide information which helps investors 
to estimate k. Statements in prospectuses and discussions with investment bankers indicate 
that pre-renounced and privately placed shares are normally placed with new investors, 
though in a few cases the shares are privately placed with an existing shareholder(s) who has 
agreed to subscribe for shares in addition to his entitlement. These shares are excluded in 
arriving at a % privately placed (new) variable. One proxy for k is therefore 1 - (%  pre-
renounced + % privately placed (new), and this can be calculated for both types of issue. It is 
an ex ante proxy based on information known before the announcement and made public on 
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the announcement day. It overstates k because it assumes that all shares not pre-renounced or 
privately placed with new investors are taken up by existing shareholders. 
In open offers only, the percentage of shares taken up by existing shareholders can be 
used as a proxy for expected take-up. In both rights issues and open offers, the broker usually 
announces the take-up shortly after the close of the offer,7 but the take-up in rights issues 
includes subscriptions by buyers of rights sold during the offer period, so it can not be used as 
a proxy for expected take-up by existing shareholders. Since entitlements can not be sold in 
open offers, the open offer take-up is entirely by existing shareholders. Thus we can construct 
a second proxy for k: % take-up + % privately placed (old). % take-up is the take-up 
expressed as a proportion of the total offer including privately placed shares; % privately 
placed (old) is the proportion privately placed with existing shareholders. This second proxy 
is an accurate measure of k ex post. We exclude offers in which the share price is below the 
offer price at offer close, because the actual take-up in such offers is likely to be lower than 
the take-up expected ex ante, and we exclude offers for which we lack a share price at close. 
The average take-up or claw-back of open offer shares (offered pro rata to existing 
shareholders) is 48% for all offers and 54% for those not excluded. 
The EM theory assumes that k is exogenous, and so is not affected by the discount. 
This is reasonable in rights issues; whilst a deeper discount increases the value of the rights, it 
does not increase the incentive for existing holders to take up their rights because the rights 
can be sold. A deeper discount in an open offer gives existing holders more incentive to 
subscribe, which potentially increases k. However, depth of discount does not appear to be the 
main factor affecting take-up in open offers. The correlations in open offers between discount 
and the first and second proxies for k are -0.16 and -0.19 respectively: a deeper discount is 
associated with a smaller take-up by existing holders, despite the larger sacrifice a deeper 
discount implies for non-subscribers.  
 
(iv) Underwriting as a Guarantee 
An alternative view of underwriting is that its main purpose is the obvious one of 
guaranteeing the proceeds, except to the extent that they are already guaranteed through pre-
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commitments. This view need not imply that the arranger of an SEO has no certification role 
at all. Rather, it implies that whether and how much of the issue the arranger underwrites 
makes little difference to the reliability of its certification, because the arranger’s reputation is 
at stake when it brings an issue to market, whether or not it underwrites, and the financial risk 
to the arranger from underwriting is small. On this view, the extra cost associated with 
underwriting reported in several studies is due mostly to the insurance premium for expected 
loss paid to sub-underwriting institutions or placees, not to an extra fee for certification.8 The 
hypothesis that underwriting is primarily a guarantee predicts a negative relation between % 
underwritten and % pre-committed, and no particular relation between % underwritten and 
proxies for k: the EM theory predicts a negative relation between % underwritten and proxies 
for k (P1), and no particular relation between % underwritten  and % pre-committed, since the 
latter includes pre-commitments by a mixture of existing shareholders and new investors.  
The contrast between the two views of underwriting is clear when one compares (a) an 
issue mainly pre-committed with new investors (k close to 0), for example an issue with most 
of the shares pre-renounced and placed with new investors, with (b) an issue with high 
expected take-up (k close to 1) and no pre-commitments. If the purpose of underwriting is to 
certify value and the EM theory is true, the arranger would be expected to underwrite issue (a) 
but not issue (b). If the purpose of underwriting is to guarantee receipt of the proceeds, the 
arranger would be expected not to underwrite issue (a), except for the shares not pre-
committed, but to underwrite issue (b). 
 
(iv) Results 
The correlation coefficients reported in Panel A of Table 2 indicate very clearly that 
underwriting and pre-commitment are substitutes. The correlation between % underwritten 
and % pre-committed is -0.77. The correlations between % underwritten and the proxies for k 
are positive, the opposite of the sign predicted by the EM theory.9 These positive correlations 
are because pre-commitment is more by new investors than by existing shareholders: % pre-
committed is negatively related to k (the correlations with the first and second proxies for k 
are -0.33 and -0.27 respectively). The finding that underwriting and pre-commitments are 
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substitutes is, of course, consistent with the US evidence in EM (1992) of substantial pre-
commitments by existing shareholders in non-underwritten rights issues.  
 
Table 2 around here 
 
Two other factors which might affect % underwritten are share volatility and discount. 
Our measure of share volatility is the standard deviation (std dev) of daily returns on the 
issuer’s shares calculated during an estimation period of 160 days, 80 on either side of a 
period from five days before the announcement to 20 days after the close of the offer. The 
expected relation between % underwritten and std dev is uncertain a priori: greater volatility 
increases the value of underwriting, but investment banks may decline to underwrite issuers 
with a volatile share price. Discount could affect % underwritten because a deeper discount 
reduces the need for underwriting to ensure subscription. In SSL’s sample, the average 
discount in non-underwritten rights issues is significantly deeper than in underwritten issues, 
prompting them to suggest that a deep discount is a substitute for underwriting (p. 167).  
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of OLS regressions with % underwritten as the 
dependent variable.10 Std dev and discount have significant coefficients, but they do not affect 
the conclusion from the correlations in Panel A. % pre-committed is much the most important 
variable in explaining % underwritten, and the coefficients on the proxies for k are positive, 
the wrong sign in terms of the EM theory. Greater share price volatility is associated with less 
underwriting, as Bøhren et al. also find, so there may be a reluctance to underwrite riskier 
companies.11 Std dev is cross-correlated with % pre-committed (correlation coefficient = 0.28 
for full sample) and with discount (0.35); these relations suggest that issuers with a volatile 
share price tend to seek more pre-commitments and to choose a deeper discount. 
A deeper (larger) discount is associated with a smaller proportion underwritten, as 
expected (correlation = -0.35 for rights issues and -0.29 for open offers), and the 84 rights 
issues and 87 open offers with zero underwriting by the arranger have average discounts 
significantly deeper than the discounts of the remaining rights issues and open offers, which 
tallies with SSL’s finding for rights issues. However, deep discounts on their own are rarely a 
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substitute for underwriting. In the regressions including % pre-committed, discount is 
negative for the rights issue sample, but nothing like as significant as % pre-committed, 
whilst discount is positive, though not significant, for the open offers sample. Consideration 
of the samples of deep discount and non-underwritten issues throws light on the regression 
results. 174 rights issues and open offers are made at a discount of 30% or deeper to the 
market price, but in only 16 of them is underwriting by the arranger plus pre-commitment less 
than 50%. In other words, only 16 issues appear to rely primarily on a deep discount to ensure 
subscription. In the 171 non-underwritten rights issues and open offers, the average 
proportion pre-committed is 69.2%, compared with 11.7% in the remaining issues, and only 
48 of the non-underwritten issues have pre-commitment of less than 50%. The MMC report 
(1999, p. 31), based on extensive interview and survey evidence, notes that company 
executives are very concerned to achieve certainty about the proceeds from the offer, and this 
concern would explain our findings.12 Certainty is achieved from pre-commitments and from 
underwriting, but not from a deep discount, though a deeper discount may help in obtaining 
pre-commitments (the correlation between % pre-committed and discount is 0.31 for rights 
issues and 0.38 for open offers). 
A final point is the weaker negative correlation between % underwritten and % pre-
committed for open offers than for rights issues. The reason for this is that there is a much 
higher proportion of open offers accompanied by private placings (Table 1), and some private 
placings are underwritten. Placings with one or two parties named in the prospectus are rarely 
underwritten; the underwritten placings are mainly those in which the shares have been sold 
to a group of institutions, as in an initial public offer by placing. Although we class all 
privately placed shares as pre-committed, the placing process in underwritten placings may 
not always be complete by the announcement date.  
 
4. EVENT STUDY EVIDENCE 
(i) Data and Method 
We found share data in Primark Extel’s database for 1,226 of the 1,378 offers in the 
sample. There were two problems with the data, both of which could affect other studies. 
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First, Extel often retains a daily price for periods during which trading in the share has been 
suspended by the Stock Exchange. We removed 70 offers announced when the shares were in 
suspension, since in these cases the price could not change on news of the offer. Extel records 
the dates when a share is suspended and when trading is resumed. Second, the record of daily 
prices is not always adjusted for the effect of the share going ex-rights, which occurs after the 
announcement. This is easiest to explain through an example. Suppose there are 100 shares in 
issue and the market price the evening before the ex-day is 80p. 100 new shares are being 
issued at an offer price of 40p. Other things equal, the market price falls to the TERP (60p) on 
the ex-day, because the share loses a right which is worth 20p. The record of prices before the 
ex-day is normally multiplied by an adjustment factor, which in this case would be 0.75. The 
adjusted record would be 60p the day before the ex-date and 60p on the ex-date. With no 
adjustment, the record would be 80p followed by 60p, so failure to adjust means that returns 
are biased downwards after the announcement. In view of this, we removed 61 issues for 
which (i) the unadjusted market price for the day before the ex-day is above the offer price 
and (ii) Extel’s adjustment factor equals one on the ex-date, ie no adjustment is made. Extel 
records the ex-date and both unadjusted and adjusted prices. We removed a further 87 offers 
which we were unable to check for suspension and non-adjustment, leaving a total of 1,008 
issues in the event study.  
We report cumulative abnormal returns calculated by the method used by EM (1992). 
For each offer a market model regression is run using daily data and dummy variables to 
distinguish sub-periods of interest: 
 Rit   =   αi  +  β iRMt  +  γ1iD1t  +  γ2iD2t  +  γ3iD3t  +  γ4iD4t  +  eit (2) 
where Rit = return on share i on day t; RMt = return on FT-Actuaries All Share Index on day t; 
D1t = one for event days -1 to 0, and zero otherwise, day 0 being the announcement day; D2t 
= one for days +1 to C-2, day C being the close of the offer; D3t = one for days C-1 to C, and 
D4t = one for days C+1 to C+20. If a share goes ex-dividend during the event period, the net 
dividend per share is added to the ex-day price to calculate the return on that day. The 
combined estimation and event period is from 85 days before the announcement (day 0) to 
100 days after the close (day C). The offer close, days C-1 to C, is separated out because 
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trading in rights in a rights issue ceases, at the end of day C-2 (MMC, 1999, p. 246). The 
coefficient γi is a measure of the abnormal return for each day of the sub-period concerned. 
The cumulative abnormal return is γi times the number of days in the sub-period. γi can be 
averaged across the sample and the test statistic for the significance of the sub-period average 
γi is: 
 z   =   √N(av[γi/sγi]) (3) 
where N is the number of offers in the sample and sγi is the standard error of the γi coefficient 
for share i.  An advantage of this method is that it enables a significance test to be calculated 
for the offer period AAR (days +1 to C-2), despite the fact that offer periods vary in length. 
The results using conventional market model abnormal returns are very similar and are not 
reported. 
 
(ii) Abnormal Returns around Rights Issues and Open Offers 
Table 3 shows AARs by sub-period and type of offer. The announcement and offer 
period AARs are -2.24% and -2.67% respectively for rights issues, and 1.99% and -0.23% for 
open offers. The AARs at offer close and during the twenty days post offer are more positive 
for rights issues than for open offers, but the total AAR from the day before the 
announcement to 20 days after the offer close is -1.68% for rights issues compared with 
3.20% for open offers. The two day announcement AAR for rights issues is slightly higher 
than the two day AAR of -3.09% reported for rights issues by SSL (2000).  
To test the EM theory, we relate announcement ARs to % underwritten and to the two 
proxies for k, controlling for other factors which affect the reaction to an issue. The theory 
predicts a negative relation between ARs and % underwritten (P2) and a positive relation 
between ARs and the proxies for k (P3). Both EM and SSL predict a reaction to underwritten 
open offers no higher than to underwritten rights issues (P4). Table 4 shows univariate 
comparisons. In issues more than 50% underwritten, the announcement AAR is -2.58% for 
rights issues and 2.92% for open offers, a significant difference (t = 8.66) which is contrary to 
P4. The AAR for rights issues more than 50% underwritten is more negative than for rights 
issues less than 50% underwritten, though the difference is not significant. This is consistent 
  20 
with the EM theory (P2) but not with SSL, who find that the AAR for their 200 underwritten 
rights issues is higher than for 20 non-underwritten rights. For open offers, underwriting is 
associated with a higher AAR, and the difference is significant at the 5% level. The open 
offer result is not consistent with the EM theory, but might suggest superior underwriter 
certification in underwritten open offers, consistent with SSL. However, the relation between 
ARs and % underwritten is not significant for open offers when discount is controlled for 
(Table 5).13  
The univariate results involving the proxies for k provide little support for the EM 
theory. For open offers, the high k samples have higher AARs than the low k samples, 
consistent with P3, but the differences are not significant. For rights issues, the high k sample 
has a more negative AAR, contrary to P3. We also examine whether the presence of pre-
renounced shares or of an accompanying private placing affects the market reaction. The 
AARs are higher for issues with pre-renounced shares, though not significantly so.13 The 
AAR for rights issues accompanied by a private placing is 3.99%, compared with -2.57% for 
other rights issues, a difference significant at the 5% level. 29 of the 35 private placings 
concerned are non-underwritten, and the AAR for these is 4.75%, which would be hard to 
explain according to the SSL view. The AAR for open offers accompanied by a private 
placing is lower than the AAR for other open offers, but the difference is not significant. 
Finally, the AAR for discounts less deep than the median for the relevant offer type is 
significantly higher than the AAR for discounts deeper than the median. 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 around here 
 
Table 5 reports a selection of cross-sectional regression results with announcement 
ARs as the dependent variable. The relation between ARs and % underwritten is not 
significant for any of the samples, which supports neither the EM view that it is overvalued 
companies which choose underwriting (P2), nor the SSL view that underwriter certification is 
sufficiently effective that underwriting is associated with a higher abnormal returns. The 
coefficient on the first proxy for k, 1 - (% pre-renounced + % privately placed (new)), is 
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negative for all three samples and significant at the 5% level for the full sample and for rights 
issues, which is contrary to P3. The significant negative coefficient for rights issues is mainly 
because the coefficient on % privately placed, and on % privately placed (new), is positive 
and highly significant for rights issues. % privately placed is positive but not significant for 
open offers. % pre-renounced is positive but not significant for either type of offer. The 
relation between ARs and the second proxy for k, % take-up + % privately placed (old), has 
the positive sign predicted by the EM theory but is not significant.15  
There is a significant negative relation between ARs and discount for all issues and 
for the sub-samples of rights issues and open offers (discount is also significant with offer 
period ARs as the dependent variable). This finding is consistent with SSL though not with 
several earlier studies of rights issues. Marsh (1977) for the UK, Tsangarakis (1996) for 
Greece and Bøhren et al (1997) for Norway find no relation between announcement AR and 
discount, while Bigelli (1998) for Italy and Loderer & Zimmerman (1988) for Switzerland 
find a positive relation. There is reason to expect a positive relation because, for a given 
amount raised and assuming unchanged or increased dividend per share, a deeper discount 
implies a higher dividend yield and larger total dividend post issue, which could be 
interpreted as a sign that the company is confident about paying more cash to shareholders. 
Bigelli (1998) presents evidence that the positive relation between market reaction and 
discount in Italy is due entirely to this effect. However, the variable that Bigelli finds explains 
the positive relation, div yield, is not significant in our regressions.  
A final point from the cross-sectional evidence is that the difference in reaction by 
type of offer is confirmed. The coefficient on a dummy variable which equals one for a rights 
issue and zero for an open offer is negative and significant at the 5% level.16  
 
(iii) Deep Discount Issues 
In view of the negative relation between ARs and discount, and in view of the long-
standing puzzle why more companies do not substitute a deep discount for underwriting, we 
investigate deep discount issues further. Table 6 shows that the abnormal loss in market value 
of companies choosing a deep discount is nearly 20% on announcement and during the offer, 
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though there is some recovery thereafter. To discover why companies choose a deep discount, 
we read the Chairman’s letter to shareholders in the prospectuses of the 174 deep discount 
issues. The Chairman’s letter runs for several pages, describing the background to the issue 
and other major events in train. There are a number of standard headings including reasons 
for the issue, terms of the issue and current trading. It turns out that many letters do not 
explicitly discuss or even mention the fact that the issue is at a deep discount,17 but we infer 
the reason if possible, and the findings are shown in Table 7. 119 (68%) of the issuers were in 
serious trouble; either the company could not continue at all without an injection of new 
equity, or it was making the issue because there was an urgent need for funds due to poor 
performance. If the discount is referred to in these cases, it is always to say that the offer price 
is ‘fair and reasonable’ in the light of the poor performance. A further 22 (13%) of issuers had 
experienced some difficulty, though it is not certain that this was the reason for the issue or 
for the deep discount. Five (3%) were raising funds for investment in mining or technology 
projects, the speculative nature of which is emphasised in the letter. Only nine letters (5%) 
state that a reason for the deep discount was to avoid paying for underwriting by the arranger. 
There is no apparent reason in 21 (12%) of the letters. The evidence is consistent with 
submissions by corporate financiers to the MMC (1999, p. 30) that deep discounts are used 
for ‘rescue’ issues. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 around here 
 
Panel B of Table 7 shows announcement and offer period AARs for sub-samples of 
poorly performing and healthy deep discount issuers. 115 of the deep discounts have usable 
event study data. The AAR on announcement is -10.3% for the 81% of issues by poor 
performers compared with -0.4% for the issues by apparently healthy companies, though 76% 
of the ARs are negative. The offer period AAR is significantly negative for both sub-samples. 
The lack of reaction on announcement to deep discounts by healthy issuers implies that the 
large falls in price for poor performers are due to bad news released when the offer is 
announced rather than to the deep discount itself. We infer that the negative relation between 
  23 
ARs and discount arises from adjustment of the offer price, and hence of the discount to the 
pre-announcement market price, in anticipation of a change in price on announcement or 
during the offer. For example, an issuer will anticipate a fall in price if it thinks that news on 
recent trading in the prospectus is worse than investors are expecting. Although the market 
does not react very adversely to a deep discount issue by a healthy company, the fact that 
most deep discount issues are by companies in trouble may be one of the reasons why healthy 
companies rarely use a deep discount as a substitute for underwriting (other possible reasons 
are discussed in MMC, 1999, pp. 29-31 and Marsh, 1994, pp. 34-7).18 
 
(iv) Uncontaminated Results 
 Most of the offer announcements are ‘contaminated’ by other news, for example 
interim results, acquisitions or management changes. Contaminated announcements are 
presumably accepted in most event studies of SEOs, since no mention is made of removing 
them. As a check on the effect of contaminating news, Table 8 shows AARs for a ‘clean’ 
sample of 124 offers in which the only major event announced is the offer itself. The 
announcement and offer period results have the same pattern as those in Table 3; the contrast 
is, if anything, greater between the negative returns for rights issues and positive returns for 
open offers. There is no recovery post-offer in the ‘clean’ sample for either type of offer. In 
cross-sectional regressions (not shown), the coefficient on discount ceases to be significant 
with announcement ARs as the dependent variable but remains significant at the 5% level 
with offer period ARs. The much reduced significance for discount in the ‘clean’ sample is 
consistent with the hypothesis that companies adjust offer prices and discounts for anticipated 
changes in share price in response to news about to be released. 
 
Table 8 around here 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence from UK rights issues and open offers lends little support to the 
assumption made by Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) that a 
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major benefit of underwriting is certification of issuer value. The EM theory assigns a crucial 
role to k, the proportion of shares expected to be taken up by existing shareholders, in 
explaining the proportion underwritten. But it is the proportion of pre-committed shares 
which determines the proportion underwritten, not proxies for k. Offers are normally 
underwritten by the arranger except to the extent that binding commitments have been given 
before the offer is publicly announced. The EM theory predicts that the market reaction to 
announcements is negatively related to the proportion underwritten and positively related to 
the take-up by existing shareholders, but our evidence does not bear out these predictions. 
SSL examine rights issues and bought deals, and argue that underwriters certify the 
value of issuers in the UK more reliably than EM assume. They argue that the reliability of 
certification depends on the financial risk borne by the underwriter. The hierarchy of 
underwriter risk is, in descending order, bought deal, underwritten rights issue and non-
underwritten rights issue, and they find that the announcement AARs by offer type display the 
same hierarchy. Our evidence does not support the SSL view of certification, though we do 
not study bought deals. We find that rights issues less than 50% underwritten have a higher, 
not lower, AAR than other rights issues. Open offers less than 50% underwritten have a lower 
AAR than other open offers, as SSL would expect, but the relation between ARs and the 
proportion underwritten is not significant after controlling for discount. If the SSL argument 
were true, the market reaction should not differ between underwritten rights issues and 
underwritten open offers, because underwriting is no more risky in an open offer than in a 
rights issue. But the announcement AAR is 2.9% for underwritten open offers and -2.6% for 
underwritten rights issues. Our sample includes rights issues accompanied by a non-
underwritten private placing. According to the SSL view, the announcement AAR ought to be 
at least as negative as the AAR for underwritten rights of -2.6%, but in fact it is 4.8%.  
Both SSL and the current study find a strong negative relation between the market 
reaction and discount. SSL contend that a deep discount signals overvaluation: a deep 
discount in an underwritten issue implies that the share price the underwriter believes to be 
correct is below the issuer’s current market price; a deep discount in a non-underwritten issue 
is used to substitute for underwriting to ensure subscription, presumably because the arranger 
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has declined to underwrite or because the certification benefit at a deep discount is not worth 
the extra cost. However, we find that deep discounts are rarely used on their own as a 
substitute for underwriting. All but 16 of the 174 issues at a deep discount (30% or deeper to 
the market price) are at least 50% pre-committed or underwritten. The prospectuses of deep 
discount issues indicate that four fifths of the issuers were in difficulty at the time of the offer, 
and there is little reaction on announcement to the minority of deep discount issues by healthy 
companies. So the large falls in price post-announcement appear to be due mainly to bad 
news released when the offer is announced, not to the deep discount itself. Thus, the price 
falls are neither because of the absence of underwriter certification (in a non-underwritten 
offer), nor because the discount is viewed as a signal that the certified value is less than pre-
announcement market value (in an underwritten offer). We suggest that most deep discounts 
to pre-announcement prices are set deep in anticipation of release of bad news, and perhaps to 
help obtain pre-commitments. The fact that most deep discount issues are by companies in 
difficulty may be one reason why very few healthy companies use a deep discount as a 
substitute for underwriting.  
 Our findings suggest that the purpose of underwriting in UK rights issues and open 
offers is primarily to guarantee the amount underwritten rather than to certify that the issuer is 
not overvalued. The analysis of the proportion underwritten indicates that underwriting is 
used as a substitute for pre-commitment to achieve certainty of proceeds for the issuer. The 
analysis of abnormal returns provides little support for predictions resulting from an 
assumption that underwriters certify, either with uniform unreliability or with reliability 
dependent on the type of offer. Thus, underwriter certification is not, in our view, the 
explanation for the positive reaction to open offers (or to private placings). A more plausible 
explanation is that there is certification by investors, and that it is the placees’ willingness to 
buy at the offer price that informs the market about the issuer’s value, rather than the 
arranger’s willingness to underwrite at the offer price. There may be other explanations. The 
advantages of open offers and the rapid growth in their use since the late 1980s merit further 
study. 
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NOTES 
1. SSL use the term ‘placing’ and say that ‘a placing is a bought deal’ (p. 160). We refer 
to their placings as bought deals to avoid confusion with private placings.  
2. The sources of information for rights issues, open offers and private placings are 
prospectuses, interviews with seven investment bankers in 1996, and Rights Issues and 
Placings for UK Companies: A Guide, 1995, privately produced by SG Warburg. 
3. The author was told in interviews that it is rare for an institution to renege on a verbal 
placing agreement. Once the institution has signed a placing (or sub-underwriting) contract 
the only risk to the underwriting bank is that the institution defaults. 
4. Extel provides scanned copies of prospectuses from 1 July 1991 onwards, and aims to 
include all issues by listed companies. Extel keeps some prospectuses on microfiche for 
issues before 1 July 1991, though its collection is incomplete. We include all issues from 1 
January 1985 to 30 September 1996 for which Extel has a prospectus. Issues by foreign 
companies and by investment trusts (closed end investment funds) are excluded.  
5. Some rights issues and open offers are accompanied by an issue of shares directly to 
shareholders of companies being acquired. We exclude these shares from the total for the 
issue. If the target company’s shareholders (the ‘vendors’ of the target’s shares) wish to keep 
the bidder’s new shares, they are merely distributed as ‘vendor consideration’ shares and are 
not underwritten. It would obviously be inappropriate to include vendor consideration shares 
in this study. If some of the vendors wish to sell the bidder’s shares, a ‘vendor placing’ may 
be organised in which shares are placed on behalf of the relevant vendors. Vendor placed 
shares are often underwritten, but they are not being sold by the issuer, so it seems best to 
exclude them. We also exclude shares placed on behalf of existing shareholders (secondary 
placings).  
6. The difference between the market price and the TERP is the expected value of the 
right or part-right attached to each existing share. N excludes shares in an accompanying 
private placing, to which existing shares carry no entitlement.  
7. The broker usually reports the number of shares taken up, as well as the percentage 
taken up, from which one can infer that the percentage take-up is often an overstatement of 
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the take-up by existing holders because the broker has excluded pre-renounced shares from 
the total of shares ‘available in the offer’ on announcement day. If an offer has pre-renounced 
shares and the take-up is reported as a percentage only, we record no figure for take-up as it is 
uncertain whether the percentage is of all the shares in the open offer or of shares not pre-
renounced.  
8. Armitage (2000) finds that direct costs of issue in the UK increase with the proportion 
underwritten, but that the costs are not related to factors likely to affect certification costs 
such as specific risk of the issuer’s shares. However, there is some evidence that US 
underwriter remuneration is related to proxies for certification costs (Armitage, 1998, pp. 44-
7).  
9. The same results are found using 2x2 tables in which both variables take a value of 
either one or zero, and significance is tested by χ2. % underwritten equals one if the issue is at 
least 50% underwritten; % pre-committed equals one if there are any pre-commitments; the 
first proxy for k equals one if % pre-renounced + % privately placed (new) = 0; the second 
proxy for k equals one if % take-up + % privately placed (old) ≥ 50%. 
10. The results are similar when the regressions are run as logit regressions, with % 
underwritten equal to one if the issue is 50% or more underwritten and zero otherwise. 
11. Underwriting fee rates are not related to issuer risk, which makes underwriting riskier 
issues less attractive (Armitage, 2000). However, discounts affect the risk of underwriting, 
and they vary considerably. 
12. To the extent that an issue for cash is used to finance the acquisition of another 
company, the Takeover Panel requires the issue to be underwritten to ensure the company has 
the necessary funds (MMC, 1999, p. 54). 49% of the issues in our sample are partly or wholly 
to finance an acquisition. 
13. The negative AAR for the 62 open offers less than 50% underwritten is due to 11 
which are deeply discounted and have an AAR of -19.6%. Section 4(iii) suggests that the 
negative reaction to deep discounts is due primarily to the release of bad news on 
announcement, not to lack of underwriter certification. 
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14. SSL report a significantly more negative AAR for 20 underwritten rights issues with 
pre-renounced shares than for 180 underwritten rights issues without pre-renounced shares. 
We do not obtain this in our sample of 421 fully underwritten rights with event study data, 94 
of which have pre-renounced shares. 
15. SSL report a significantly positive relation between announcement ARs and the 
percentage take-up reported by brokers at the end of rights issues, and note that this is 
consistent with the EM theory. We obtain this finding but doubt its value as evidence for the 
theory, both because the reported take-up of rights includes subscriptions by buyers of rights 
in the market (including new investors) as well as by existing shareholders, and because a fall 
in price on announcement and during the offer can cause a low take-up if the share price is 
below the offer price at close. The relation between announcement AR and % take-up is not 
significant in either rights issues or open offers if issues in which the share price is below the 
offer price at close are excluded.  
16. Other regressions, not reported, include issue proceeds, proceeds/issuer market 
capitalisation and an ownership concentration variable, none of which are significant. The 
only variables SSL find to be significant in explaining the reaction to rights issues are 
discount, take-up (but see note 15) and a dummy for pre-renounced shares (but see note 14). 
17. A remarkable exception is the letter presenting the placing and open offer by 
Harrington Kilbride plc dated 23 August, 1995, which notes the Directors’ opinion that ‘the 
mid-market price... reflects market-makers’ quotations for dealing in small quantities... [and 
not] the price at which investors would be prepared to invest further significant sums in the 
Company... Despite recent announcements... the market price reflects optimism about the 
future under new management instead of the current and recent trading performance’ (p. 9). 
18. There remains the question why there is no negative relation between ARs and 
discounts in markets other than the UK. The determination of the very variable discounts in 
those markets has been little studied. Also, the lack of relation between ARs and discounts in 
the UK before the mid-1980s (Marsh, 1977; SSL, 2000) warrants further investigation. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                   All       Rights     Open 
                 issues        issues     offers 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Underwriting by arranger 
% of issues 100% underwritten 57.8% 57.0% 59.5% 
% of issues 0% underwritten 12.5% 9.1% 19.5% 
In sample with some underwriting, av % underwritten 91.8% 90.9% 94.1% 
N 1374 927 447 
    
Pre-commitment    
% of issues with some pre-commitment 62.7% 63.3% 61.3% 
In this sample, average %  pre-committed 30.2% 25.8% 39.5% 
N 1376 927 449 
 
 % with shares pre-sold to existing shareholders 53.9% 58.7% 44.1% 
 In this sample, average % sold to shareholders 12.0% 12.4% 11.0% 
 
 % with shares pre-sold to others  12.1% 10.6% 15.4% 
 In this sample, average % sold to others 54.7% 53.6% 56.2% 
 
 % of issues accompanied by a private placing 12.4% 6.7% 24.2% 
 In this sample, average % privately placed 48.9% 53.2% 46.5% 
 
Pre-renunciation 
% of issues with some shares pre-renounced 34.0% 27.6% 47.3% 
In this sample, average % pre-renounced 32.2% 32.6% 31.7% 
N 1375 927 448 
 
Discount  
Average discount to market price (discount) 18.5% 21.0% 13.0% 
Median discount to market price 16.0% 17.6% 7.8% 
N 1251 858 393 
Average discount to TERP 13.1% 15.1% 8.7% 
Median discount to TERP 12.0% 13.6% 5.8% 
N 1248 855 393 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Notes: all proportions are of the amount of the rights issue or open offer plus the amount of 
the private placing, if any. Shares issued to shareholders of companies being acquired are not 
included. Shares underwritten = underwritten by arranger; pre-committed = commitments to 
subscribe have been received before announcement (= sold to shareholders + sold to others + 
privately placed); sold to shareholders = offered pro rata to existing shareholders and they 
have undertaken to buy; sold to others = offered pro rata to existing shareholders and others 
have undertaken to buy; privately placed = not offered pro rata to existing shareholders; pre-
renounced = offered pro rata to existing shareholders and renounced before announcement; 
discount to market price (discount) = (market price at close of day before announcement less 
net dividend per share to which new shares are not entitled, if applicable, less offer 
price)/(market price less net DPS to which new shares are not entitled); discount to TERP = 
as for discount, but using theoretical ex-rights price instead of market price. Issues at a 
premium of 5% or more to the market price are excluded from the samples for discount. 
Sample numbers vary due to missing data. Source: own calculations for all variables, from 
information in prospectuses and company announcements, from Primark Extel. 
 
  33 
Table 2 
Factors Affecting Proportion Underwritten 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Correlations with % underwritten 
 All issues                 Rights issues                Open offers 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
% pre-committed -0.77 -0.86 -0.65 
 -44.1 -51.0 -17.9 
N 1,372 926 446 
 
1st proxy for k 0.17 0.17 0.12 
 6.4 5.4 2.5 
N 1,362 917 445 
 
2nd proxy for k   0.07 
   1.5 
N   271  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Regressions with % underwritten as Dependent Variable 
  All issues Rights issues  Open offers 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
    
Constant 0.86 1.026 0.90 1.021 0.87 1.05 1.03 
 25.2 99.4 20.5 101.8 14.6 20.0 47.1 
 
Discount  -0.30 -0.02 -0.49 -0.14 -0.21 -0.39 0.15 
 -4.9 -0.4 -6.5 -3.3 -1.6 -2.7 1.4 
 
Std dev -4.92 -2.42 -3.54 -0.39 -5.71 -5.61 -4.36 
 -10.3 -7.1 -5.7 -1.1 -7.0 -6.7 -6.5 
 
1st proxy for k 0.18  0.16  0.13 
 5.0  3.9  1.8 
 
2nd proxy for k      -0.07 
      -1.0 
 
% pre-committed  -0.80  -0.90   -0.69 
  -35.4  -42.1   -13.6 
 
Adjusted R2 16.8% 59.9% 16.6% 74.4% 17.6% 20.8% 45.5% 
F-value 75.9 557.3 51.5 742.3 25.8 23.6 99.0 
N 1120 1120 765 765 355 264 355 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Notes: t-statistics are in italics. 1st proxy for k = 1 - (% privately placed (new) + % pre-
renounced); 2nd proxy for k = % take-up + % privately placed (old); privately placed = 
privately placed before announcement with new investors (new) or with existing shareholders 
(old); % take-up = (shares offered pro rata to existing shareholders for which they 
subscribe)/(open offer shares + privately placed shares), excluding offers with share price <  
offer price at close or not known; std dev = standard deviation of daily share return during 80 
days before and 80 days after the event period. Take-up figures are from company 
announcements after offer close. Other details are as in Table 1.  
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Table 3 
Abnormal Returns around Rights Issues and Open Offers 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (AARs)for: 
 Announcement Offer Offer Post 
  (days -1 to 0) period  close offer 
  (+1 to C-2) (C-1 to C) (C+1 to C+20) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All issues -0.96% -1.93% 0.56% 2.13% 
(N = 1,008) -9.65 -4.94 6.49 7.30 
% negative 58.2 58.0 45.4 44.3 
 
Rights issues -2.24% -2.67% 0.76% 2.47% 
(N = 702) -22.92 -7.17 7.30 6.79 
% negative 68.2 60.3 42.2 43.9 
 
Open offers 1.99% -0.23% 0.10% 1.34% 
(N = 306) 17.19 1.89 0.72 2.97 
% negative 35.3 52.9 52.9 45.1 
 
t-stat for open offer 5.63 2.33 -2.76 -0.96 
AAR less  
rights issue AAR 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: see Section 4(i) for method of calculation. z-statistics are in italics. An AAR and its z-
statistic can differ in sign because the ARs are not equally weighted in arriving at the z-
statistic.  
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Table 4  
Abnormal Returns on Announcement 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
     t-stat for 
 Announcement  z- % difference  
 AAR N stat negative in AAR 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Rights issues 
% underwritten > 50% -2.58% 618 -24.7 69.3 
% underwritten < 50% 0.28% 83 -0.6 64.2 -1.04 
 
1st proxy for k = 1 -2.96% 472 -22.9 69.1 
1st proxy for k < 1 -0.86% 225 -7.7 67.6 -2.29 
 
2nd proxy for k > median na 
2nd proxy for k < median na 
 
With pre-renounced shares -1.63% 209 -10.3 68.4 
Without pre-renounced shares -2.49% 493 -20.6 68.2 0.97 
 
With private placing  3.99% 35 6.3 48.6 
Without private placing  -2.57% 667 -25.0 69.3 2.27 
 
Discount > median -0.96% 339 -10.4 65.2 
Discount < median -3.90% 339 -24.0 72.6 3.57 
 
Open offers 
% underwritten > 50% 2.92% 243 19.3 32.9 
% underwritten < 50% -1.71% 62 -0.3 45.2 2.14 
 
1st proxy for k = 1 2.34% 117 10.2 38.5 
1st proxy for k < 1 1.85% 188 14.2 33.0 0.40 
 
2nd proxy for k > median 3.85% 112 16.8 28.6 
2nd proxy for k < median 2.52% 112 9.1 31.3 1.08 
 
With pre-renounced shares 2.02% 158 14.3 32.3 
Without pre-renounced shares 2.05% 147 10.3 38.1 -0.02 
 
With private placing  0.13% 47 3.0 36.2 
Without private placing 2.33% 259 17.4 35.1 -0.92 
 
Discount > median 3.04% 143 14.9 31.5 
Discount < median 0.60% 143 7.8 37.8 1.95 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: announcement AAR = cumulative average abnormal return for days -1 to 0. Median 
refers to median value for each variable by type of offer. Other details are as in previous 
tables. 
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Table 5 
Cross-Sectional Regressions for Abnormal Returns on Announcement 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 All All All Rights Rights Open  Open Open 
 issues issues issues issues issues offers offers offers 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Constant 0.042 0.058 0.070 0.049 0.066 0.016 0.053 0.034 
 5.65 4.67 5.06 2.60 3.33 0.86 2.56 2.22 
 
Discount  -0.207 -0.254 -0.247 -0.271 -0.239 -0.237 -0.260 -0.107 
 -5.09 -8.92 -9.00 -7.73 -6.93 -4.97 -5.80 -2.25 
 
Rights issue -0.019 -0.017 -0.016    
 -2.24 -2.21 -1.99   
 
Div yield -0.033      
 -1.16      
 
% underwritten  -0.015  -0.027  0.030 
  -1.32  -1.59  1.67 
 
1st proxy for k    -0.032  -0.047  -0.008 
   -2.11  -2.40  -0.33 
 
2nd proxy for k        0.015 
        0.62 
 
% privately placed    0.169  0.021   
    4.20  0.52 
 
% pre-renounced    0.014  0.014   
    0.70  0.54 
 
Adjusted R2 10.3% 10.5% 10.8% 9.8% 7.0% 10.6% 10.3% 2.2% 
F-value 33.1 38.4 39.2 19.1 25.6 9.14 16.9 3.0 
N 853 963 959 677 674 285 286 218 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: table shows OLS regressions in which dependent variable is cumulative abnormal 
return (ARit) for days -1 to 0. t-statistics are in italics. Div yield = (market price/TERP) x (new 
DPS/previous DPS). New DPS/previous DPS is assumed to equal one unless prospectus 
contains a new DPS forecast. Companies not paying a dividend are excluded. Rights issue = 
dummy variable which equals one if issue is a rights issue, and zero otherwise. Other details 
are as in previous tables. 
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Table 6  
Abnormal Returns around Deep Discount Issues  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Cumulative average abnormal returns for: 
 Announcement Offer Offer Post 
  (days -1 to 0) period  close offer 
  (+1 to C-2) (C-1 to C) (C+1 to C+20) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All issues -8.49% -10.19% 1.10% 8.37% 
(N = 115) -16.73 -4.76 2.10 3.28 
% negative 73.0 69.6 42.6 40.0 
 
Rights issues -7.73% -10.46% 1.35% 9.06% 
(N = 92) -14.81 -4.25 2.24 3.42 
% negative 75.0 69.6 41.3 41.3 
 
Open offers -11.52% -9.13% 0.09% 5.62% 
(N = 23) -7.79 -2.14 0.24 0.50 
% negative 65.2 69.6 47.8 34.8 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Sample consists of issues at a discount to pre-announcement market price of 30% or 
deeper. z-statistics are in italics. 
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Table 7  
Evidence on Deep Discounts 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Reason for Deep Discount Number % 
 
1. Crisis. The Chairman’s letter states explicitly that the company will not survive or is unlikely to survive 56 32.2 
unless the issue proceeds. 
2. Distress. The letter states or implies that the issue would not have been proposed were the company 63  36.2 
not in financial difficulty, but stops short of saying the company could not continue without the issue. 
3. Recent or current difficult trading. There is no apparent reason for a deep discount except that the  22 12.6 
letter states that trading is or has recently been difficult. 
4. Risky use of proceeds. The letter emphasises that the proceeds will be used in a speculative venture. 5 2.9 
These are either mining or technology companies. 
5. To dispense with cost of underwriting. This reason is given in nine letters, but one of the companies 7  4.0 
is in category three and one in category four. 
6. Not known. There is no reason for a deep discount discernible in the prospectus. 21 12.1 
 
Total 174 100.0 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Announcement z- % Offer period z- % 
Panel B: Event Study Results AAR (%) statistic negative AAR (%) statistic negative N 
 
Poor performers (categories 1-3)   
All issues -10.29 -16.57 72.3 -9.89 -3.48 69.6 94 
Rights issues -9.82 -14.89 75.3 -9.24 -2.92 69.4 73 
Open offers -11.93 -7.30 61.9 -12.23 -1.92 70.0 21 
 
Others (categories 4-6)  
All issues -0.40 -4.07 76.2 -12.36 -3.74 71.4 21 
Rights issues 0.32 -3.39 73.7 -15.96 -3.70 73.7 19 
Open offers -7.23 -2.74 100.0 21.78 -0.73 50.0 2 
 
t-statistic for difference in AAR (all issues) 1.92   -0.39 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8  
Abnormal Returns for Uncontaminated Sample 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Cumulative average abnormal returns for: 
 Announcement Offer Offer Post 
  (days -1 to 0) period  close offer 
  (+1 to C-2) (C-1 to C) (C+1 to C+20) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All issues -2.23% -2.83% 0.54% -0.12% 
(N = 124) -11.79 -3.62 2.35 0.25 
% negative 66.9 63.7 41.1 50.8 
 
Rights issues -3.23% -3.94% 0.87% -0.14% 
(N = 98) -14.88 -4.92 2.86 -0.13 
% negative 75.5 68.4 36.7 52.0 
 
Open offers 1.03% 1.32% -0.69% -0.04% 
(N = 26) 3.14 1.66 -0.42 0.80 
% negative 34.6 46.2 57.7 46.2 
 
t-stat for open offer 2.81 1.30 -2.79 0.02 
AAR less  
rights issue AAR 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: Sample consists of issues with no news on announcement other than issue itself. z-
statistics are in italics.  
 
